

# TRANSCRIPT

A Victory Coalition-Israel 365 Action Briefing  
on the Prospects for Actual Peace

## When is a Deal Not a Deal? The Fragile “Ceasefire” In Gaza

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Media File: Webinar\_Ceasefire.mp4

**[00:00:00] Frank Gaffney:** Welcome to this jointly sponsored briefing of the Victory Coalition and **Israel 365 Action**. It is our joint effort to try to make sense of what is happening at the moment in the Middle East, specifically with respect to the—not just the ceasefire we’re told is in effect, and actually, according to the **Vice President** of the United States, doing rather better than had been expected—but a larger framework for peace that has been **bruited** as possibly ending 3,000 years of conflict in the region.

**[00:00:51]** These are fairly high bars, needless to say, and we’re going to try to bring as truthful, unvarnished, and **[00:01:00]** timely an assessment of how this is in fact sorting out—and, in particular, how it’s sorting out bears on the vital security interests of Israel, right there, of course, in the middle of this thrash, but also for the United States and, we argue at the Victory Coalition, Western civilization more generally.

**[00:01:32]** Indeed, that is ultimately what is on the line, and that is what makes, in our estimation, so vital an outcome that involves—very clearly—the decisive, unconditional surrender of Hamas and victory for the forces of Western civilization, led in this case at the moment by the **[00:02:00]** government of Israel under **Benjamin Netanyahu**.

**[00:02:03]** We’re going to get into various aspects of what is taking place at the moment: the tactical situation on the ground in Gaza; the role that is currently being played not only by Hamas but also by some of its sponsors who have been transformed of late into forces of “moderation,” and the leverage that will bring Hamas to lay down its arms, to disarm, and ultimately to essentially vacate—if not in the literal sense of the word—certainly in the sense of any role in governing **Gaza**.

I’m so pleased to be able to welcome to the program our co-host, co-moderator, and co-sponsor: **Rabbi Pesach Wolicki**, the Executive **[00:03:00]** Director of **Israel 365 Action**. He is, among other things, a columnist for the *Jerusalem Post* and a podcaster—and a co-host of the podcast **Shoulder to Shoulder**.

**[00:03:14]** We’re very appreciative of him being with us on this occasion and

bringing several of his compatriots from Israel to provide further insights into how this looks from folks on the ground—particularly folks with distinguished records of military service; people whose assessment and judgment on these matters is vitally needed, in my estimation.

**[00:03:38]** Rabbi, it's good to have you with us, sir. Let me turn it over to you for your welcoming comments now.

**[00:03:44] Rabbi Pesach Wolicki:** Thank you, Frank. And that was excellent framing. We definitely are in a very tense period. All of the high-falutin talk about how this is peace in the Middle East and the end of 3,000 years of conflict is premature, to say the **[00:04:00]** least.

**[00:04:00]** And we're going to get into all those details, but I want to take a little bit of a 30,000-foot view and just—perhaps for some of our audience I'll be repeating myself and some things that I've said in the past—but about 30 years ago I had the opportunity to spend a few hours with an aging German-Jewish philosopher who was quite well known in the Jewish community.

**[00:04:23]** Our Jewish audience of a certain age will be familiar with him. His name was **Emil Fackenheim**, a very famous Jewish philosopher of the 20th century. He was near the end of his life and he had been associated with the left for most of his life and had parted ways with them because of his opposition to the **Oslo Accords**.

**[00:04:42]** I was in my twenties at the time and had the opportunity to spend some time with him. We were talking about the situation—this was in the mid-nineties, just a couple of years after the beginning of the peace process—and he said to me... I said, "What's your **[00:05:00]** assessment of all this? You've parted ways with your left-wing compatriots." And he said to me, "It's all very simple." He said there is one mistake that the West makes—and Israel, he was talking at the time—that Westerners make about the Middle East, and all the other mistakes are extensions of this one mistake.

**[00:05:24]** Now, it's a bit reductionist, I admit. But this is how he put it: The mistake they make is that they believe that economic interests are more important than religious-ideological ones—because to them, economic interests are more important than religious-ideological ones. And therefore, he went on to explain,

**[00:05:48]** they believe that even if our enemies speak in religious terms and speak in terms of being willing to sacrifice themselves and their children for the sake of jihad, they don't **[00:06:00]** really take them seriously. They hear the words, but they poo-poo them. And we saw this in the *60 Minutes* interview with **Steve Witkoff** and **Jared Kushner** the other day, where Jared Kushner came right out and said this.

**[00:06:11]** He said, "We're not paying so much attention to rhetoric that's being said. We know that in the end of the day, people want a better life for themselves." And this is a fundamental misunderstanding that ends up clouding our judgment. It clouds our judgment on our assessment of what our enemies' motivations are.

**[00:06:28]** We see this playing out in so many ways. We saw it in **Iran**, where

President Trump, at the end of the **12-day war**, said that he's going to allow the Iranians to continue to sell their oil to the **Chinese Communist Party** because they need to rebuild their country and give a better life to their people.

**[00:06:45]** And of course that's not what the Iranian regime does with its money. We also see the error of this in things like a poll that was done—a **Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research** poll. This is a **[00:07:00]** Palestinian research company out of **Ramallah**. This is the Palestinian Authority's own polling agency, and they polled Palestinians both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in **May 2025**, just a few months ago.

**[00:07:12]** And one of the questions in that poll was the following—listen carefully: “Are you in favor of Hamas laying down its weapons if it will mean the end of the war?” Very simple question. **Sixty-five percent** of **Gazans** said **no**. Sixty-five percent of Gazans said no—that they were not in favor of Hamas giving up its weapons if it would mean the end of the war.

**[00:07:42]** Now, that's unfathomable to a Westerner. Westerners think, “How could that possibly be? It doesn't even make sense. These people are supposedly starving and supposedly being genocided, and there's bombing and they're being displaced and the war is going on. How could it be that they would rather the war **[00:08:00]** continue than have Hamas lay down its weapons?”

**[00:08:04]** And yet Western governments make statements like how we need to work to give a better life to the people of Gaza—assuming that's what they want over and above jihad. And so we find ourselves in a situation where, like many of the wars—like pretty much all of the wars most of them—that the West has fought since **World War II**, we stop short of removing the evil actors from power.

**[00:08:30]** And in the end it just comes to some kind of accommodation where they remain exactly where they are. And this, I believe, is a moral failing that has plagued the West ever since **World War II**—when **Franklin Delano Roosevelt** declared that the only acceptable end to the war would be the **unconditional surrender** of **Nazi Germany** and **Imperial Japan**.

**[00:08:51]** The only acceptable outcome: unconditional surrender. And it's no wonder that those two genocidal, evil regimes **[00:09:00]** and populations who were indoctrinated by them had a change of mind and a change of heart—because defeat does that to a people. The Bible tells us this straight out in **Psalms 83**, that bringing shame upon the faces of the wicked brings them to recognize the truth.

**[00:09:18]** They must feel that sting of defeat in order for there to really be change. So we find ourselves once again with Israel's hands being tied, with **Hamas** remaining in power. And what's more—as we're going to hear from some of the experts here—there are serious security implications downrange that present the prospect that this war did not end, sadly—or will not end—in an actual defeat of the evil actors, in actual removal of Hamas from power, to begin the long, difficult process of re-educating and changing the culture in the Gaza Strip.

**[00:09:56]** If that's possible—we have to believe that it's possible if we believe that

truth can [00:10:00] win—the only way it can happen is first by actually defeating the evil actors, bringing them to their knees so that their population sees it. And these are the big-picture issues that are facing us right now. I believe that **President Trump**, with all his good intentions, honestly believes that economic interests—having a better, materially prosperous life—are more important to this population

[00:10:26] than their jihadist, Islamic-fundamentalist ideology. That's where we find ourselves today. So the name of the group that is partnering with **Israel 365 Action** on this is **Victory Coalition**. And I'm proud to be a member of the Victory Coalition. And the name "Victory Coalition" is deliberate, because we understand that, as the old adage goes, there is **no substitute for victory**—

[00:10:50] which is not just a way of saying we want to beat our chests and declare victory, but it's a way of saying that the only real way forward to true moral progress—which is [00:11:00] why war is worth fighting—is to bring the evil actors to their knees, to actually be victorious over them. So this is a very perilous moment.

[00:11:11] It's a very tense moment for Israel. We're going to get into some of the granular details, and we are honored to be joined by—as Frank mentioned—some incredible experts. And Frank, should I go ahead and introduce the general. So our first speaker—we are truly honored to be joined by him. He is universally acknowledged throughout the State of Israel as one of the most authoritative experts on national security. He is an advisor to the highest levels of government, and he is the founder of **IDSF – Israel Defense and Security Forum**. He is **Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi**, and we are honored by his presence here. General Avivi,

[00:11:58] please give us a situation [00:12:00] report on what we are currently facing in the **Gaza Strip**, and what is the way forward. General Avivi.

[00:12:06] **Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi**: Thank you very much. I really agree with everything you said. I want to go back for a moment to this moment in Washington—after the **UN**, when **Prime Minister Netanyahu** arrived in Washington and said... Then suddenly we heard about this plan and 20 points.

[00:12:25] When I was watching this, I said to myself, this is **Yalta 2025**—meaning this is something that reminds me of the **Yalta Conference**. The Yalta Conference was held in February 1945, three months before the unconditional surrender of the Nazis. At that moment, the general public didn't know that was it—the war was won.

[00:12:55] Usually you can see the win a few months before, but then there is the moment it's final. But for **Stalin**, for **Roosevelt**, for **Churchill**—in February 1945—it was obvious that the Nazis lost. And therefore they convened in Yalta and discussed two things: one, what is Germany the day after—how they're going to divide Germany; and two, what is the world order the day after?

[00:13:21] And I think that something very similar happened in Washington. There was a realization among all the players—including **Turkey**, **Qatar**, the whole Arab world—that basically **Hamas** lost. At the stage we were at then, it was obvious that it would maybe take a month or two, and that's it—it's game over.

[00:13:46] Why game over? Because at this stage—part of the fact that we defeated **Hezbollah**, destroyed the **Syrian** army, brought **Iran** to its knees, and hit very seriously also the **Houthis**—while doing that in Gaza, we reached a point where we conquered completely 80% of the **Gaza Strip**.

[00:14:12] When I say “conquer,” I mean we took over the area and we completely destroyed **Hamas** in this area—and all the infrastructure in this, say, 80%. And also, all the **Gazans** were moved out of the 20%. So Israel was controlling basically most of Gaza already. It surrounded **Gaza City**. It conquered half of Gaza City.

[00:14:37] All the **Gazans** were moved from this major stronghold—the **Hamas** stronghold—to the humanitarian zone. And this brought an understanding: it's game over; Hamas basically is about to lose. And then its supporters—Qatar, Turkey—were faced with two options: either Hamas is going to be destroyed and the day after Israel and the U.S. will do whatever they want in the **Gaza Strip** and apply any policies they feel like; or Qatar and Turkey and Hamas are given a chance to save parts of Hamas, get them out of **Gaza**, release prisoners, let them regroup—I don't know—somewhere else, maybe in Turkey.

[00:15:24] And also an opportunity for Qatar and Turkey to be active players in this emerging global alliance—Western–Israeli–Sunni alliance—which is supposed to be the moderate countries: **Indonesia**, **Malaysia**, **Oman**, **Saudi Arabia**, and so on. And I can say that Turkey and Qatar felt they were being left aside and also losing **Hamas**.

[00:15:53] It was a lose–lose situation for them, and they wanted to find something that might be perceived by them also as a win–win: being involved, getting to be part of this process, and also managing to save some parts of Hamas. Now, Israel set crystal-clear three goals of the war from the beginning: eradicating Hamas as a governmental and military entity; bringing back all the hostages; and creating the terms that never again will there be a terror army—meaning overriding Israeli security over the Gaza Strip.

[00:16:32] All these goals exist in the 20 points. Whether they're all going to be achieved or not, we'll see—but they exist in the agreement. And Israel said, “Okay, we want to see the first stage. We want to get all our hostages in 72 hours.” It happened partially—yes, we got all the hostages **alive** in 72 hours, but not all the hostages were **alive**.

[00:17:02] And this is a breach of the agreement. We're still getting hostages, and Israel is not going to give up until every single hostage is back. The reality in the agreement is that once we start the process, Israel **reduced** from the 80% it had conquered to **53%**. So Israel is physically controlling more than half of the Gaza Strip.

[00:17:30] Israel is controlling almost all of **Rafah** and all of **Philadelphi**, controlling the northern part. It's controlling the perimeter and beyond what's called the **yellow line**. So basically, the basic situation is that Hamas is completely surrounded by the **IDF** from all sides. They cannot smuggle through Egypt as they did before, because we fully control **Philadelphi** and **Rafah**.

[00:17:58] The positions are on the high ground, controlling the coastal area. And of course there's the belief that Israel can move forward and go inside. Now we are in the **second stage**, and in the second stage **Hamas needs to demilitarize**—they need to lay down their weapons. And we know it's not really happening at the moment.

[00:18:22] And the **Prime Minister of Israel** has stated again and again: it can happen the nice way or the hard way—meaning Israel is saying we are not going to have a reality where **Hamas** doesn't disarm; they need to lay down their weapons and get out of Gaza.

[00:18:44] And it hasn't happened yet. And I think what I'm understanding from the situation is that on one hand the Prime Minister wants to give America a chance to do this diplomatically—to get **Qatar** and **Turkey** to coerce Hamas to lay down the weapons and get out—to try to do it without renewing the war.

[00:19:11] On the other hand, I had quite a few talks with the Chief of Staff, and he said to me again and again in the last few months: we need a bit of time to take care of the equipment, of the APCs, of the tanks. He was always looking to find some time to organize the army.

[00:19:33] So my assessment is that we're in a situation where the Chief of Staff is saying to the Prime Minister, "Look, we understand that we'll probably have to go back to fighting. It would be good for us to have a month or two to organize ourselves and get the soldiers some rest, and organize the defenses along the yellow line, and take care of the tanks and APCs, and all of that."

[00:19:55] On the other hand, Israel needs to show that it's giving a chance to diplomacy, and try to get the U.S.—with all the optimism and everything that the Rabbi said about economy and prosperity, and maybe they want a better life; we know it's not the case, but it doesn't matter—we need to show that we're giving this a chance.

[00:20:16] But as we are doing that, we saw also that the Prime Minister is taking all this leadership of the U.S.—like the **Vice President**—to meet with the leadership of the army, and the leadership of the army is presenting the harsh reality of what is really going on in Gaza—and not only in Gaza, also with **Hezbollah**—that they're trying to rebuild the ties with **Iran**.

[00:20:47] And really trying to connect the leadership of the U.S. to the reality of the Middle East and what is really going on by presenting the intelligence that we have. We [00:21:00] heard **President Trump** again and again saying, "If you don't lay down your weapons, there will be violence—let the Israelis attack."

[00:21:09] The rhetoric of the President is clear, and I think there is a clear alignment between the U.S. and Israel—and an understanding that this war needs to be won decisively. We cannot have a reality where Hamas stays in power. And so I know that there are concerns, and there is no unconditional surrender yet.

[00:21:39] Although I think that once Hamas gave up the only thing that really defended them—which is the **live hostages**—this creates a reality that once the IDF renews its operation, there's nothing that can stop us. It will be much easier to maneuver and work fast, as we did with **Hezbollah** or **Iran**, and so on.

[00:22:04] We can win decisively pretty fast. And the question is **when**. Now, we understand that—as I said—it's like a Yalta agreement. It's about what is Gaza the day after, but it's also about regional and global peace agreements. And I think both **Netanyahu** and **President Trump** understand that you cannot move forward towards these desirable peace agreements—very important for both leaders, especially due to the fact that they both have elections in **November**—without finishing the job in Gaza, one way or another.

[00:22:38] So we have a timeframe—I would say probably the end of the year. In this timeframe we need to achieve **demilitarization** or at least the defeat of **Hamas**, one way or another—and we'll see how the dynamics develop.

[00:23:06] The Israeli people are awakened after the **7th of October**. Nobody is going to believe that we can live with a reality that Hamas is regrouping again in Gaza. We know that they might renew attacks on our soldiers on the yellow line. They might kidnap a soldier. They might kill more soldiers—as they did this week, killing two soldiers in **Wapa**—

[00:23:33] so there is a clear expectation from Israeli society that we finish the job and destroy Hamas. But what will be the timeframe? We'll wait and see. It's complicated. We have to bridge between diplomacy—doing things in a way that keeps this coalition that is moving towards normalization working together.

[00:23:56] It's very complicated, and we have to build the legitimacy to go back to fight and disarm Hamas, as we want to do.

[00:24:09] **Frank Gaffney**: Thank you. Are you able to stay with us, sir, and take some questions towards the end—or do you need to shoot? Great. Wonderful. Let me, if I may, Pesach, introduce our American participant **Dr. David Wurmser**. He has been incredibly faithful in terms of participating in these briefings. We are deeply appreciative of both the expertise he brings to these topics—having served in senior positions in the **State Department**, the **National Security Council**, and the **Office of the Vice President** over several decades in government life, including also, by the way, as a **Naval Intelligence** officer. David is these days with the **Center for Security Policy**, runs its Middle East program, and he is just extraordinarily astute, I think, on all of these matters.

[00:24:56] And David, I particularly hope that you will [00:25:00] speak to some of the points that the General just made about some of the harsh military realities that I'm sure are of concern to both our friends in Israel—and should be to us here—as to how long a volunteer—not necessarily volunteer, but a reserve-based—force of Israeli soldiers can be kept waiting for the diplomacy to either pan out or fall through.

[00:25:28] And obviously, other points that are on your mind about the feasibility of

this entire enterprise, and the American role in it at the moment, would be most welcome as well. Over to you, sir.

**[00:25:41] Dr. David Wurmser:** Sure. I'm going to start with that last question first, because it bears on a lot of things. I don't believe Israel can stay like a gun with a cocked trigger much longer.

**[00:25:50]** It needs to demobilize and—as **Amir** was saying—regroup, fix, basically reinvigorate the **IDF** over a period of a few months. So if nothing gets done in the next few days—and it may already be demobilizing—I think the Israeli army will start demobilizing. And I think that's part of what Hamas' strategy is: they feel if they can drag this out another week or two, they can drag it out for a lot longer than that.

**[00:26:16]** That leads to the next point, which is—I agree with what **Amir** says; I think that's the right framework to look at it. I also agree with what was said about our fundamental assumption that is actually not applicable—but I would add a second one. And it emanates from the way I play chess.

**[00:26:36]** I always had brilliant plans in chess—but I always lost. And the reason for it was, as brilliant as my plans were, the other side always had a better plan, and they also had the right to make moves, and they had the right to implement their strategy. And I think the idea right now that we're holding is way too self-centric:

**[00:26:57]** namely, the idea that you can divide **Gaza** up and have a holding pattern on the rest of Gaza while they essentially stew in their juices, and eventually maybe they'll come around or whatever. But my sense is that the planning has begun already on the **Hamas** side—on how to take the next hostage, violate the ceasefire, and essentially make unlivable Israel's presence in Gaza behind the yellow line.

**[00:27:26]** In other words, they're looking toward **Lebanon** in 1982–2000/2023—which is essentially to whittle Israel down, and whittle it down by a war of attrition from their area into Israel. And they can do it not only the way they did in Lebanon—which was periodic **insurgent**-type attacks.

**[00:27:50]** The lines on the yellow line are not entirely stable. There are tunnels all over the place—some may not be known. We saw how on Monday Hamas still

**[00:28:00]** employed some of those tunnels to do what it did. It's a very dangerous and unstable circumstance. So I think Hamas is holding its fire, holding off a little bit—waiting for that window of opportunity for Israel to go in to close for a while, and then start going for the longer run.

**[00:28:19]** And so we're dealing with chess with an enemy that is very aggressive and has its own strategic plans. The Yalta framework—I think we have to assume that the Yalta framework is important—but Yalta had several elements to it. First of all, it is a regional alliance, and I would turn to two statements by **Vice President Vance** as key in this. One was—he said last night, I believe—it outlined essentially a strategic concept: that Israel is a strong country, a **victor's** country; it aligns with moderate Arab states, and it forms a strategic **[00:29:00]** foundation, much the way Europe formed with Germany after **World War II** into **NATO**, which grounded America in the **Cold War**. That's true, and I think there is such a strategic formulation



out there—

[00:29:12] anchored ultimately to the **Abraham Accords**. How we get there is a different question, but that is, I think, the strategic concept—and it's not a bad concept. The second concept—unrelated to the Middle East—is that the West is in a civilizational struggle. We saw that in his statements about **Europe** and the fact that Europe has to be saved from this internal threat that is destroying Europe. So he understands conflict: strategic conflict is also an element of civilizational struggle.

[00:29:28] Now, why do I raise these two things? Going back to Yalta—there were several conditions that were met. First of all, Yalta was followed by **VE Day (Victory in Europe Day)**. Israel has yet to win. There's not a single front that is settled. We see it in **Lebanon**, we see it in **Iran**, we see it in **Gaza**. I already discussed a little bit how Gaza is not a stable front—and that's not a victory yet. It is a massive Israeli tactical victory,

[00:30:14] but it is not yet the final strategic defeat, which is essential to moving to a post-war circumstance. The structure of defeat of the other side is transforming. You had Iran as the primary threat, and it remains the primary threat—and it remains alive. It's wounded, but a wounded cobra can still kill, and it can recover.

[00:30:40] It cannot be allowed to sit in the corner to nurse its wounds and its elements—for example, **Hezbollah**. So essentially, that is not settled. But then I go to the second one, which is the thing that's unsaid that is unsettled even more, which is: the **allies** have to be on the same page. We saw what happened at Yalta.

[00:31:02] Yalta was a structure where the allies thought they were on the same page, but within five years—or really two, three years—they were in a fundamental twilight struggle as great as World War II for the soul of civilization, a struggle that only ended in 1989 with the Soviet Union. The **Soviet Union** was not on the same page as the West.

[00:31:24] And as a result, Yalta organized the West—and it was very critical to that—but it didn't organize global **peace**. It organized only a peace among like-minded nations to confront the next great challenge. And in this, I think we have to look at the third part, which is: what is the focus of the civilizational challenge?

[00:31:48] **Iran** is part of the focus of the civilizational challenge facing the West, facing Israel. It is this Islamist thrust to destroy Western civilization. But what we're seeing is a transformation. Just as we saw the transformation of the Nazi/fascist threat into the Soviet threat, we are seeing the transformation of the **Shiite Islamist** threat into the next phase—which is the **Sunni Islamist** threat.

[00:32:22] And as Yalta broke down into a new Cold War, I think we're anchoring an assumption that **Qatar** and **Turkey** are on the same page as **Saudi Arabia** and the **UAE**—and **Israel**. **Egypt** I leave aside, because I think Egypt is an entirely separate and very dangerous and critical question; but lots of that will have to do with who wins and how this gets shaped.

[00:32:52] So where are we right now with this peace process? We are at Yalta—but

what's going on? Over the last two years, Qatar and Turkey—leveraging Iran's attack via **Hamas** on **October 7**—have effectively reinserted the **Palestinian** question as the gateway to regional integration into the **Abraham Accords**.

[00:33:18] That is specifically—the key element of which right now is the **Saudi-Israeli** peace. And that was part of the reason why Iran did it. But Qatar and Turkey are in a strategic competition—very serious; it hasn't waned—between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on one side, and Qatar and Turkey on the other.

[00:33:40] They are in a battle over the soul of the **Sunni** world, and it's a very dangerous battle; and it is a battle that will not be won anytime soon, because the Sunni world is in a great state of effervescence, in flux. And unfortunately, the **Muslim Brotherhood**, the Islamist view of it, will have very strong currency in the coming years—which profoundly threatens the **Saudis** and the **UAE**—and **Qatar** is leveraging that.

[00:34:08] So this strategic threat is not going to go away. **Saudi Arabia** found itself outmaneuvered over the last years simply because it had, through the Abraham Accords, removed the **Palestinian** issue as the gateway for broader peacemaking. It actually inverted it: that broader regional peace would eventually unlock the Palestinian issue—not the other way around.

[00:34:31] Qatar and Turkey—again, leveraging Iran's attack on October 7—have now reinserted the Palestinian issue. And moreover, Hamas' very survival is critical to them, at least as a political force—even if it's called something different. The **Muslim Brotherhood**/Islamist element of Palestinian life is critical for Qatar and Turkey because that gives them a grip over the Palestinian issue,

[00:35:00] which gives them then a grip—a veto—over Israeli–Saudi–**Qatari** amicability and strategic formation. So this becomes a critical strategic issue over the Palestinian issue—which is why I think the foundation of this agreement, which really rests on a consensus, is not stable at this point. And that strategic issue has to first work itself out.

[00:35:38] And the Israelis obviously have a vested interest in Saudi Arabia and the UAE prevailing in that—which is why they don't want Turkish forces or Turkish influence controlling **Gaza**. And ultimately, I would strongly suggest that **Qatar** doesn't—because really Qatar is the epicenter of the **Muslim Brotherhood** threat to the West right now. So you have that structure.

[00:36:06] And then there's a final overlay that has to be resolved too, which is: although Turkey is part of **NATO**, and Qatar now has **Article 5**–like defense arrangements with the United States, they are the anchor right now to **Chinese** intrusion into the Middle East. The **Belt and Road** extends to them. All you have to do is look at the Turkish–Indian conflict—and there is a Turkish–Indian conflict that really drives what's going on here—and it's a **Chinese** strategic interaction with **Iran, Qatar, and Turkey** to try to base itself against a structure that is more Western-oriented,

[00:36:35] which is the **India–UAE–Saudi Arabia–Israel–to–Greece** structure—the

**IMEC** structure—which is a trade structure, but really has a strategic implication to it. This is the other major strategic threat, and again, Gaza becomes the epicenter—because who wins this? The **Turks** and the **Qataris**, which would then put Israel in a very dangerous strategic position,

[00:36:56] or the **Saudis** and the **UAE**, in which case you can actually begin to construct this threat [counter to China]. So at the end of the day, I think that we have to go back to **Vance's** statement about this regional alliance—but the regional alliance is **Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE**. That is what will unlock for the United States a fundamental ability to begin to disengage from the region and essentially subcontract vital interests to our allies.

[00:37:23] If we do not get that, then we are setting ourselves up for **endless wars**.

[00:37:28] **Frank Gaffney**: David, thank you. This is extremely sobering, and I think your clarification as to what it was that **JD Vance** presumably is referring to in terms of this strategic alliance is extraordinarily helpful. Rabbi, we have one more guest from Israel, and we are anxious to have you introduce him at this point.

[00:37:48] **Rabbi Pesach Wolicki**: I'll do that, but first I want to make a comment about what **Dr. Wurmser** said—and maybe I'm going to make it now and not in a question period, because... and maybe you could respond to it later—but just to sum up a point you made or extend it: [00:38:00] the **Obama/Biden** administrations made a strategic error that everyone talked about—choosing to engage with **Iran** and thus alienating the **Saudis** and the **Emiratis**.

[00:38:13] But we dare not think that the Muslim world is made up of two camps, and it seems that the **Trump** administration is dangerously committing a similar mistake in embracing the **Qatar-Turkey alliance** and also somewhat alienating the Gulf—the **Emiratis**, etc.—and the **Saudis**.

[00:38:33] And this is just one more dangerous aspect of the situation that we're facing here. And one other comment on that point is that in this move from an Iranian multi-front war against Israel to a **Sunni** multi-front war against Israel, as you describe it—at least with the Iranians, everyone was open about the fact that they were our enemy.

[00:38:59] The problem with [00:39:00] the **Qataris** and the **Turks** is that there's this game of pretend that they're a friend—that they're friendly actors—which actually makes things diplomatically far more complicated. But we'll leave that for comments coming soon.

It's my honor and pleasure to introduce my dear friend **Maj. Elliott Chodoff**. **Elliott** has been an educator and a lecturer on issues of strategic affairs, the Middle East, and history at **University of Haifa** and other institutions for many years. He continues to serve as a reserve officer in the **IDF**, serving in some very important positions.

[00:39:36] And he is one of the most articulate explainers of the security and

strategic situations that Israel faces. He's also the host of a wonderful—and essential—podcast called **Conflict Uncovered** (put it on your list; the episodes aren't too long, but they're very in-depth if you really want to understand the strategic situation on the ground).

[00:39:57] He's also, I'm happy to say, a frequent contributor to [00:40:00] the **Shoulder to Shoulder** podcast, where he unpacks what's going on. And, **Elliott**, you have the luxury—perhaps—of batting cleanup, and that gives you the opportunity to also comment on what's been said up to this point and share your own situation report as you see the lay of the land in this very volatile moment.

[00:40:18] **Maj. Elliott Chodoff**: Thank you, **Pesach**. Yeah—I'm going to do this more as comments around, or in relation to, what's been said rather than repeat much of what has been said. I want to start with the **Yalta** model that **Gen. Avivi** brought. The great difference, I think, between where we are—this attempt to create a “day after” regional arrangement—and Yalta is that at **Yalta** they understood that the first step was **unconditional surrender**.

[00:40:47] And I want to emphasize that point for a moment, because I think there's a slight misunderstanding: **victory** and **unconditional surrender** are not the same thing. The Allies could very well, in [00:41:00] February or March of 1945, have declared victory in Europe. The **Reich** was essentially destroyed. German industry was essentially destroyed.

[00:41:09] It would have been a legitimate military statement to say, “We have won, and we can stop right here.” **Unconditional surrender** means that your enemy recognizes that he has been defeated. There's an interesting statement in conflict sociology that says wars end when the **loser quits**. And that was true both in Europe and in Japan.

[00:41:34] The other side had to quit before the war was declared over and victory was declared. So with all due respect—and I have great respect for the **IDF**, which I continue to serve in—where we are today is a consequence, first of all, of a horrific **defeat** on **October 7**. I don't think there's any other way to describe it: October 7, 2023, was a defeat—period. [00:42:00]

But what we've seen since then until now is a series of **tactical successes**—some of them brilliant. I'll use **Hezbollah** as the greatest example of “brilliant.” The inability to close **strategically** in **Gaza**—in other words, a war that, by all indicators (and the Chief of Staff has alluded to this in many ways), has gone **too long**—leaving an IDF that is fatigued in terms of personnel, equipment, and munitions; it needs time to **reconstitute**, to rebuild itself.

[00:42:42] Whether it's two months or three months, or six months or a year—it needs to step back and **pause**. We are in a situation where, with all of the great successes—and, as I said, many of them, including the urban warfare in **Gaza**, were brilliant (you know me, I'm not an easy grader; very [00:43:00] high grades; very sharp learning curve on the part of the IDF and the troops in the field; combined-forces operations—I can give an entire lecture on it)—but the result is that, when it's over, where we are at the moment, **Hamas is still there**. Hamas is unrepentant;

Hamas is rebuilding; and Hamas is not stupid.

[00:43:22] I don't think we're going to see massive attacks in the near future from **Hamas**. We will see the sniping here and the shooting there. And please note: when the two soldiers were killed the other day, Hamas said, "It wasn't us, it was rebels." And the **United States** immediately bought into that—for its own reasons, whether they believe it or not—and told Israel to shut down its response.

[00:43:46] Hamas is testing; Hamas is pushing. Now, here we have a tremendous difference between what's happening in **Lebanon** and what's happening in **Gaza**—not from the point of view of our enemies, but from the point of view of [00:44:00] freedom of action of the **IDF**. Up until 2023—up until October 7—the IDF policy vis-à-vis our enemies along the border was tolerated. Part of it had to do with the economic misconceptions that you talked about—payoff. And I agree with you a hundred percent on the idea that economics drive people's behavior.

[00:44:34] That's a **Marxian** concept; it's an **Adam Smith** concept. But we all know—and, by the way, we don't have to go to radical Islamists—we are all people on this panel, and I imagine the people who are listening to us; we are people with our own beliefs, with our own ideas. Would we sell out our families, our country, our belief system for money? I would hope the answer is **no**. In other words, economics is not the driving force behind much of the decision-making we make, even as private individuals.

[00:45:00] Add radical ideology—add **Islamist jihadi** ideology—and then economics have very little to do with it. So this idea where "they're going to rebuild, and so life is going to be beautiful"—that's what they should have been doing before **October 7**. What's the big difference this time around? **Israel** has taken an attitude of **zero tolerance**. That's the philosophy on both fronts—north and south.

[00:45:25] The difference is that in the **north**, with **Hezbollah**, the IDF has **free reign** to do that—and, by the way, with great success (but not absolute success). Rebuilding is being **stopped** a lot, but it's not being stopped completely. In **Gaza**, an attempt to prevent that is being **stopped by the United States and its coalition**—each for their own reasons. The U.S. is doing it because I think the **Trump administration** really wants to impose a **permanent ceasefire**, and hopefully **peace**.

[00:45:54] I don't see that happening. Anybody who reads the **Hamas Charter** knows that peace is not what they're interested in. [00:46:00] The **Egyptians**, the **Qataris**, the **Turks** are all doing it for their own reasons, and none of them are good for Israel. But nonetheless, what I think we're going to be seeing over the next months is a continuing **testing** by **Hamas** of the agreement—as it's continuing to do, for example, with the **bodies of the hostages** who are no longer alive. They're going to **drag that out**.

[00:46:23] They know where they are—they know where many of them are—and, all of a sudden, they "find them" when it suits them. But at the same time they are **destroying opposition** in Gaza, making it very difficult—if not impossible—for there to be any sort of alternative within Gaza. And here I must say that this is reminiscent

of an American experience in **Iraq**.

[00:46:44] In **1991**, the United States instigated a **Shiite** rebellion (during **Gulf War I**) against **Saddam Hussein**. And then, when it happened, the Americans didn't step in to help it—and the Shiites were **massacred**. In **2003**, when the U.S. went into Iraq to get rid of Saddam, [00:47:00] the Shiites wanted to have **nothing** to do with the Americans, because they said, "You didn't help us then. We don't trust you. How do we know you're not going to leave us hanging out to dry?"

[00:47:06] This is exactly what **Hamas** is doing now in **Gaza**, which will make it extremely difficult to form any sort of **opposition** to them on the ground. They are rebuilding; they're reorganizing. It's true: tunnels under the **Philadelphi Corridor** are probably completely closed—I wouldn't put a hundred percent on that—but they are **getting weapons by drone from Egypt**, and they're getting a lot of them.

[00:47:27] They're not at the point yet of building up a massive **rocket** capability, but their timeframe is not months—it's **years**. And they've said it outright: they're looking at a **three- to five-year** period. The West is going to **lose interest**, it's going to **lose its attention span**. If a **multinational force** does go in there—Qataris and/or Turks and/or Egyptians—they're going to do exactly what **UNIFIL** did [00:48:00] in **South Lebanon**, which is to **protect the terrorists from Israel**.

[00:48:20] And we will be in a position where we will identify a **Hamas missile production** facility with a **Qatari** unit stationed next to it—and not be able to hit it for fear of killing Qataris or Egyptians or Turks or whatever. That's the real danger of where we are today. And, again, just to summarize: it's not a danger that will explode on us, in my opinion, in the next weeks and months, but it's one that will **fester** and ultimately **blow up three to five years** down the road.

[00:48:38] **Frank Gaffney**: Thank you, **Elliott**. Boy, there's a lot to unpack here, and we don't have a lot of time to do it—as we're mindful of everybody's time.

[00:48:43] But I did want to say, as a kind of overarching theme that I think each of you have laid out: there does seem to be a **fundamental mischaracterization** of the nature of this exercise. It has been [00:49:00] presented to the American people—I believe it's been presented to the Israeli people as well—as a formula for not just a **hudna** (temporary postponement of fighting to allow, in this case, Hamas to regroup, rearm, and then resume the fighting under more favorable circumstances), but rather a **peace** predicated on the promise that **Hamas** is going away—disarmed, out of government, out of position to exercise further influence.

[00:49:37] And when we hear comments made by various envoys of the United States—including the **Vice President**—to the effect that "this is really going well," as I mentioned earlier—"better than we expected"—that can simply indicate that they didn't think it would be **foregoing** at all, perhaps. But it seems to me possibly **delusional**—and, at the very best, **misleading**—if we're encouraging folks to think that (a) **Hamas** has agreed to any of those steps to go away; and (b) that, in the absence of that—and more likely the presence of **Turks** and **Qataris**, and possibly **Egyptians** as well—the situation in **Gaza** could be profoundly different and worse than it was on **October 6th**.

[00:50:25] I'd invite any comments from you, **Pesach**, and our guests.

[00:50:37] **Rabbi Pesach Wolicki**: With the few minutes we have left, Frank, we haven't heard too much good news here—but I would like to go back to the top and hear some comments from **Gen. Avivi**, just to close out his thoughts on what he's heard, and maybe some closing comments from **Gen. Avivi**. And then maybe we could go around the horn and get some short comments from each of the other panelists as well. **General Avivi**, if you have some closing thoughts. [00:51:00]

[00:51:00] **Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi**: It seems like the atmosphere is very gloomy—not on the **7th of October** or the **6th of October**.

[00:51:08] I think that the Israeli government understands exactly what's going on. In Israel nobody intends to let **Hamas** stay in power. They're not going to build rockets. It's not going to be three or five years. In my understanding—from what I talked to in the army, the government—**Hamas will be destroyed one way or another**, and **Gaza will be demilitarized**.

[00:51:29] And in this agreement I want to remind everybody that Israel **forever remains in Gaza**, remains in **Philadelphi**, remains in the **perimeter**, and has **overriding security responsibility** in the Gaza Strip. In **Lebanon**, we are degrading **Hezbollah** constantly—but the solution is not us.

[00:51:56] The solution is really **Lebanon** dismantling **Hezbollah**, with the help of the U.S.—[00:52:00] rebuilding the Lebanese army and bringing, or trying to bring, Lebanon into this alliance that is going to be built. And there is a motivation to do so. The Lebanese are pushing away **Iran**, and Iran has been weakened a lot. There is more to do, but part of this process is building this alliance and the **harsh sanctions** that are being imposed now on Iran.

[00:52:18] **Gaza is not Lebanon**. In Gaza we can ourselves do the job. We have to make sure that **Hamas** is **demilitarized** and that they get out of Gaza. But before, we had a huge pressure of time because of the **hostages**—we needed to get the hostages alive and get them out.

[00:52:51] Now we have a bit more time. There is a bit more flexibility to try to get the best of the **diplomatic** solution. We understand who we're dealing with. We know what **Turkey** is, what **Qatar** is, and also what **Egypt** is. We understand exactly who we're dealing with. We're not counting on them a lot,

[00:53:12] but—as I said—I think it's like a month or two where we need to show willingness to the diplomacy. And also the army needs time to organize the equipment, and so on. But I think there will be a moment—if we don't see in the coming weeks, month, month and a half—**laying down the weapons**, there will be a moment where **Israel will go in and dismantle them**.

[00:53:37] There will be **unconditional surrender** at the end of the day. This is my prediction. I don't see the future gloomy, and I don't think we're on the **6th of**

**October.** I don't think that the **Prime Minister** and this government can afford not winning decisively the war; not bringing all our hostages; not dismantling **Hamas**; and not **demilitarizing the Gaza Strip**.

[00:54:03] These objectives are very clear **goals of war**. By the way, if they're not achieved, there will be **no government**—this government will fall. And **Netanyahu**—the last thing I can imagine he would like to be remembered for is **losing the war**, because not achieving the goals of war is losing the war. And it doesn't seem to me he intends to lose the war.

[00:54:26] **Rabbi Pesach Wolicki**: This is a very important point—especially as you indicate: the Israeli public is not going to stand for any outcome that does **not** include the **destruction of Hamas**. And it could come to a point where the diplomatic environment needs to change—and perhaps the **Trump administration** will see the light on that more and more as **Hamas** continues its bad behavior.

[00:54:43] There's no one I trust more than **Gen. Avivi** regarding the situation—and a lot of what's going on behind the scenes. Thank you for that more optimistic outlook than the gloominess we've been sharing. I guess we're just expressing the tension and the worry that everyone in Israel is feeling right now.

[00:55:03] Thank you, **General Avivi**, for honoring us with your time today and making the time to do this—it's greatly appreciated.

[00:55:08] **Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi**: Thank you very much.

[00:55:10] **Frank Gaffney**: And let me just say, in addition—from your lips to God's ears, General—we certainly hope. Thank you. You're right. **David**, let's take a quick closing comment from you, responding to what's been said here—gloom, or something...

[00:55:23] **Dr. David Wurmser**: I'm actually relatively optimistic—I'm optimistic on Israel, because of exactly what **Gen. Amir Avivi** just said. The Israelis have to get this right—and they also have to get **Iran** right, and they have to get **Lebanon**. They just don't have a choice anymore. It can be messy—they can try to get it wrong and still get it right—but ultimately, under **Churchill's** old dictum about democracy—that they'll try everything until they get it right—they **will** get it right in the end.

[00:55:52] My problem is more the **United States**. We are seeking to disengage because we have global conflict [00:56:00] that we really need to start focusing on. We are **not mobilized** for a global confrontation yet—and we are facing the potential of one. And the Middle East really does have to begin to **shut down** as a problem for us.

[00:56:12] Again, if we get this right, we have set up the Middle East wonderfully; but if we don't get it right, we will not have the alliance to rest our defense on that allows us to **unlock** and go elsewhere. **Israel** will have enough power—and I believe it will also finish the war with **Iran** as well—and I don't believe the regime will be long for this world after that. In which case the real prize isn't even **Saudi Arabia**—it's **Iran**.



And then you've got a very powerful alliance structure upon which Israel's defense is anchored.

[00:56:57] My problem with the United States is **Qatar** and **Turkey**—it's what was said: it's the enemy we don't [00:57:00] see. And more than that, it's not just the enemy we don't see—it's an enemy **internal** to the West. They're the ones who are funding the radicalization of Islamist movements in **Europe**. **Turkey** is the one organizing the structures of organization for the radicalization of Europe. And we also see how much they've intruded in the **United States** in buying news organizations—**Newsmax** was just... there was a purchase by the royal family of Qatar. We see the universities now.

[00:57:25] The problem is **Qatar is not benign**—they're **Muslim Brotherhood**. Their goal is the **destruction of the West**. And they want to be **in the tent**—they want to be our ally—in order to **burn down the alliance**, in order to **burn down the tent**. They want to be part of the **peacemaking** structure in order to **torpedo** the peace between **Saudi Arabia** and **Israel**. They're not a positive actor in this.

[00:58:00] And most of all, you get down to the fundamental thing that **Cyrus Vance**—**JD Vance** (that dates me)—**JD Vance** said about Europe when he gave that speech a couple of months ago about the survival of **Europe**: it is a **civilizational war**—that is **number one** the issue for the United States. And in that civilizational war, **Qatar** is **not** on the right side—it's not on **our** side. So it is imperative for the United States to ensure that **Israel**, **Saudi Arabia**, the **UAE**, ultimately the **Iranian people**, **Greece**, and so forth, emerge as **victorious**, and we begin to **redefine** our understanding of **Qatar** and **Turkey**.

[00:58:43] Maj. Elliott Chodoff: I agree with **David**, and I wish I could have the independent optimism of **Gen. Avivi**. I believe that **Israel**—and the Israeli leadership, government, and military—understand the situation. In other words, this is not about a [00:59:00] strategic misunderstanding or a tactical misunderstanding on the part of either the political or military leadership of Israel.

[00:59:07] I think what's happened is that we are now in a situation where we are paying the price for **two decades of poor policy** in Israel—that included a stripping down of the military; not stockpiling properly in terms of munitions; reducing and eliminating **munitions production** in favor of buying it with American credits in the United States.

[00:59:34] In other words, even if Israel wanted to—tomorrow—turn around and say, "Okay, we're going in to get rid of **Hamas**," and I think the **IDF** is capable (and I think it'll be more capable in a couple of months, for reasons that we discussed)—it's capable of doing it. The question is: what happens when the American administration turns around and says, "**No, you won't**," and... [01:00:00]

[01:00:00] For all of its reasons—all of its misunderstandings—and, **David**, I agree 100% with your analysis of that. I just want to take it a step further: **Qatar** isn't just **Muslim Brotherhood**—it's **Wahhabi**. In other words, the Muslim Brotherhood is an overlay on an already **radical** situation. They are **hardcore** to the core.

[01:00:19] And they are very much involved in American public decision-making. So my question is—and sorry to sound so pessimistic about it—**Israel does not have the military independence** to go out and launch this kind of a campaign. Look at what the result was with the failure... I was 100% in favor of the attack on **Hamas leadership in Qatar**. It failed. You don't judge an operation based on success or failure—some of them do fail—but look what the **outcome** was. Look at the **American response**. Look at the **public** response: "We had to rein **Bibi** in; he had lost control."

[01:01:00] This imagery is not good for Israel, and it **limits** Israel's ability to operate in the **short-term** future. And that's one of the reasons—that's my concern—much less Israel's leadership's understanding of the situation.

[01:01:12] **Rabbi Pesach Wolicki**: Let me pick it up from here, **Frank**, and just make my final comment—and build off what **Elliott** just said, what **David** just said, and what **Gen. Avivi** ended with. Near the beginning of the war, I believe **Israel** made its most fundamental strategic error in this entire war: **declaring that the return of the hostages was a second primary goal of the war**, on par with destroying **Hamas**.

[01:01:38] I wrote an op-ed at the time in the *Jerusalem Post* where I made the simple point that you **cannot have two primary goals**. There's no such thing—when they come into conflict with each other, you have to **choose one**, and then you know which goal is primary. And what's happened here is that **Hamas** took hostages, and had Israel—from the very beginning—said, "Look, we want to get the hostages back; we [01:02:00] hope we can get them back; but it's **not** the goal of the war. The goal of the war is the **destruction of Hamas**," it would not have created the narrative framing that we're in right now.

[01:02:20] Because where we are right now, much of the world—and the U.S. administration—look at Israel and say, "Hey, look, you got your hostages back. I know you didn't get everything you want, but the **war's over**—you got your hostages back." Because for two years **Israel** has been going on every talk show and in every statement saying, "If **Hamas** would release the hostages, this war could be over." And that has led us into a very problematic situation.

[01:02:52] And also, just to extend what **Elliott** said and put a bow on it really—and as a response to **Gen. Avivi**—while it's true that militarily, from a **tactical** perspective, yes, the fact that **Hamas** doesn't have hostages makes it easier to go in and finish them off, from a **diplomatic** perspective it makes it far more difficult. And that's the **conundrum** we find ourselves in right now.

[01:03:00] And I agree with everything that **Elliott** just said in his final assessment. That'll be my final words for the evening—and to close us out, I'll kick it back to you, **Frank Gaffney**.

[01:03:10] **Frank Gaffney**: Thank you, **Pesach**. Thank you to each of you. The comments obviously reflect a considerable amount of, I think, shared **concern**. The **optimism** seems to arise from confidence in the spirit and the strategic

understanding of the perilous situation in which **Israel** finds itself—and how the people of Israel, who are actually people with a say in what their government does...

[01:03:36] The wellspring of the **pessimism**, or the concern, I think is—as **David** particularly has laid out very clearly—if the **United States** government remains of the view that what is of surpassing importance is the **appearance of peace**, or the appearance of a **structure for peace**, and the appearance of various nations in the region working together towards peace—

[01:04:11] will that become a **governing constraint** on the desires—or the felt needs—of the government of **Israel** and its people? And to the detriment of—not just those folks—but also of the **United States** as well. I'm personally not clear how one can construe what's going on here as a truly **civilizational struggle**, and believe that people who are on the **other side** in that epic civilizational struggle—who are imbued with **Hamas'** not only tactical imperatives, but also this notion of what I call **sharia supremacism**...

[01:05:25] If that is the case, then what we're talking about—and I put it starkly, admittedly, in terms of pre-**October 6th**, or pre-**October 7th** at least—the situation is different in several important respects. Just to summarize: one, Israel has done **extraordinary** things, to be sure—among other things, perhaps the most important is what it has done to **take down Iran** and take down **Hezbollah's** proxy threat for Iran. Not vanquished them—not decisively, permanently defeated them—but having done **great damage** to those threats.

[01:06:00] That's the **good news**. The not-so-good news is that there seems, to some extent, to be a kind of **bipartisan alignment** in the **United States** today that did not exist on **October 6th, 2023**—with Democrats vehemently hostile to **Israel**, and Republicans—at least some of them—indicating that actually our interests are not as aligned with **Israel's** as I personally believe they are, but in fact now need to **take precedence**.

[01:06:35] Some have called **Israel** now a **protectorate** of the United States—and that it must simply do what it's told. I don't believe that is the **President's** view—I hope it's not—but some of the folks around him seem to share it, and some of the policies seem to bespeak it. So I would just leave with this hopefully optimistic note:

[01:06:56] The purpose of these programs is to try to **showcase** where the national-security priorities of the **United States** should align. And it's **not** with **Turkey**, and it's certainly not with **Qatar**, and it's not with what **Egypt** has become of late. It is, I think, largely—if not in every instance—aligned with the needs of **Israel** in this epic **civilizational struggle**.

[01:07:32] And pursuing that policy approach, with that understanding in mind, I think will not only conduce to the **decisive victory** that is required, but will help what one might call **Judeo-Christian civilization**—some might call **Western civilization**, some may simply call **civilization**—**prevail** in these very perilous times as well.

[01:08:03] I pray that will be the case. I want to again thank my friend and colleague, **Pesach**, for helping us put this together; our three wonderful presenters—**Gen. Amir**

**Avivi, Dr. David Wurmser, and Maj. Elliott Chodoff.** As ever, you have done what we need to do, which is to set out the facts and hopefully set the stage for better and more enduring peace in the future.

**[01:08:33]** Thank you to you all for listening. I hope you will help us maximize the impact of this program by helping us disseminate it. Until next time, this is **Frank Gaffney**—thanks for joining us.